CI2 International Intelligence Disclosure Agreement (IIDA)
Foreign Disclosure and Release of CI2 Classified Information
I. Purpose of the IIDA.
a. To provide criteria under CI2 directive for foreign disclosure and release of classified intelligence, including information collected and disseminated and/or analyzed by CI2 and/or international members associated with CI2.
b. To characterize the eligibility or ineligibility of foreign disclosure to foreign governments of CI2 intelligence.
c. To provide further guidance regarding proper consideration of requests to authorize the foreign disclosure or release of intelligence.
II. This IIDA applies to all international membership of CI2 whether paid or unpaid, volunteer or internships.
III. Criteria for determining the appropriateness and suitability of foreign disclosure and release of classified intelligence to foreign government entities.
a. Intelligence may be considered for foreign disclosure or release if:
i. Disclosure or release is consistent with U.S. foreign policy and national security goals and objectives; and
ii. Disclosure or release can be expected to result in an identifiable benefit to the U.S., such as:
1. Serving a specific U.S. national purpose in support of diplomatic, political, economic, military, or security policies as determined by CI2 Executive or Deputy Executive Directors.
2. Obtaining commensurate information or services from the proposed recipient.
3. Supporting bilateral or multilateral treaties, alliances, agreements, arrangements, or plans.
4. Aiding U.S. intelligence or counterintelligence activities.
b. Generally, foreign disclosures and releases are authorized when it is determined that the intelligence to be disclosed or released is likely to be given adequate protection. Adequate protection includes confidence that:
i. The intelligence will not be further disclosed or released to another government or any other party without the approval of CI2 Directors.
ii. The foreign recipient has the capability and intent to provide U.S. intelligence substantially the same degree of protection provided it by the U.S.
iii. The intelligence will not be used for other than the stated purpose without the approval of CI2 Directors. Also, is not likely to be used by the recipient in an unlawful manner, or in a manner harmful to U.S. interests.
c. The following types of intelligence may not be disclosed or released to foreign recipients:
i. Intelligence, the disclosure, or release of which would be contrary to U.S. law, or to agreements or treaties between the U.S. and foreign nations.
ii. Intelligence, not publicly available, on a U.S. person, unless collection, retention, and dissemination of such information is authorized by CI2.
iii. Intelligence derived from Grand Jury Information under Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 6(e)(3)(D), unless disclosed or released in a manner consistent with Department of Justice Guidelines.
iv. Intelligence that was obtained through intelligence liaison or through established intelligence relationships from another government or from a combined effort with another government when that government has not consented to the disclosure or release or has explicitly prohibited the disclosure or release.
d. In the following circumstances, intelligence information is generally not authorized for foreign disclosure or release:
i. The disclosure or release would reveal intelligence about the recipient country or its territories, dependencies, or dominions, unless such intelligence was produced jointly or obtained with the assistance, consent, or request of the recipient country, unless there is a clear and overriding benefit to the U.S.
ii. The disclosure or release could reasonably be expected to jeopardize U.S. diplomatic, military, or intelligence liaison relationships.
iii. The disclosure or release could reasonably be expected to jeopardize ongoing U.S. diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities known to CI2 disclosing or releasing the intelligence.
iv. The disclosure or release would include information that reveals either directly or by inference the existence of specific collection, counterintelligence, or special activities or cover related activities that would endanger the future of these activities, or jeopardizes the safety, welfare, or reputations of the individuals connected with these intelligence activities, specifically:
1. Intelligence operations, plans, and targets that identify units or individuals engaged in clandestine collection or collection support activities.
2. Registration or coding of intelligence sources.
3. Past, present, or planned clandestine or overt intelligence operations and support activities, which require protection to ensure that assets, operations, or objectives are not revealed.
4. Cover providers, sponsors of cover support, cover support organizations, facilities, and methodologies that require protection to ensure mission integrity.
v. The disclosure or release would identify a specific source, either by name, title, position, or description as the origin of intelligence information.
vi. The disclosure or release would reveal specific details of the most sensitive aspects of past, present, or future intelligence collection systems that could reasonably be expected to jeopardize systems capabilities and result in the loss of collection opportunities.
vii. Disclosures and releases that would support or facilitate lethal action.
Also, per CI2 Policy 2019-14, CI2 Identity Requirements, Full Disclosure Agreement, All international applicants must disclose any and all affiliations they may have with foreign governments, businesses, and entities that could potentially become conflicts of interests with the type of work produced and conducted by the Center for International Cyber Intelligence for its U.S. government partners, law enforcement, and U.S. government-affiliated entities.
According to the applicant, is there any of these organizations that may pose a conflict of interest?
*************Add Below in Application**************
I have read over the following agreements and by my signature, attest that I will never breach these agreements, and if I am in breach, that possible expulsion from CI2, and possible criminal actions can be taken against me.